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I.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED

This Court has recognized a narrow exception to the

requirement that a non-party to litigation receive notice and an opportunity
to be heard before an order is entered that may be applied to that non-party,
limiting that exception to cases where the non-party is acting in concert
with a party, or the party can only act through others (such as a union that
can only act through its members).
Can that narrow exception be extended to a non-party without any
factual findings to support that extension, thus allowing courts to deprive
online publishers of notice and the right to be heard before infringing their
First Amendment rights by ordering them to remove online content?
2.

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) and (e)(3) prohibit courts from treating

any “provider … of an interactive computer service … as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another content provider,” and,
separately, from permitting a “cause of action [to] be brought” or “liability
[to] be imposed” if it is “inconsistent with this section.”
Despite Section 230’s statutory immunity, may a court enjoin a
website publisher and require it to remove third-party-created content from
its website—and impose contempt citations and related liabilities that might
flow from a failure to abide by such an injunction—merely because the
plaintiff chose not to name the website publisher as a party in the litigation?
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II.

REASON REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED

Occasionally a legal principle adopted to prevent abuse gets
transformed through misinterpretation into a weapon for abuse. When that
happens in California, it falls to this Court to step in and correct such
misuse. This is such a time.
In a published decision, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate
District, Division Four, affirmed an injunction, entered without notice or an
opportunity to be heard, against Yelp. The injunction required Yelp—a
non-party in the litigation—to remove reviews from its website Yelp.com
(along with Yelp’s related websites and mobile applications, referred to
simply as “Yelp”). Without meaningful analysis, and dismissing Yelp’s
First Amendment right to control its website, the appellate court invoked a
common law principle created to prevent parties from evading an injunction
through gamesmanship (i.e., by acting in collusion with non-parties). The
court did not find, or even consider whether, Yelp had engaged in such
conduct. The appellate Opinion contemplates contempt and sanctions
proceedings against Yelp if it refuses to comply, although Yelp has no
material connection to the enjoined party and engaged in no wrongful
conduct.
This Court’s review of the court of appeal’s due process analysis is
“necessary to secure uniformity of decision [and] to settle an important
question of law”—whether non-parties are entitled to notice before being
2

subject to an injunction that infringes their rights, including, as here,
fundamental First Amendment rights. Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(b)(1). The
appellate Opinion drastically expands the narrow exception to due process
invoked by the court, applying it to a novel factual scenario without any
evidence that the exception should apply—and, indeed, expressly
disclaiming the need for any evidence. Op. 21.
In effect—and without analyzing whether these cases should be
extended to this very different factual scenario—the court turned a narrow
exception into a general rule, which now allows courts across California to
expressly name non-parties in injunctions without any factual findings of
misconduct. Cf. Eric Goldman, Yelp Forced to Remove Defamatory
Reviews—Hassell v. Bird, Tech. & Mark. Law Blog, June 8, 2016,
available at http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/06/yelp-forced-toremove-defamatory-reviews-hassell-v-bird.htm (“Goldman II”) (“I guess
California courts have virtually unlimited discretion to apply injunctions to
non-parties as they see fit?”). In doing so, the court rendered meaningless
the careful guidelines California courts have adopted to limit the scope of
this narrow exception, giving litigants nationwide an incentive to forum
shop in California and a roadmap to circumvent due process rights here.
The court of appeal combined its unwarranted expansion of this
limited common law principle, with an unprecedented narrowing of the
protection provided by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230
3

(“Section 230”), to deny Yelp the federal immunity it would have received
if Hassell had sued it. Addressing this issue for the first time in California,
the court exalted the form of the action—namely, the fact that Yelp was
tactically not named as a party—over the substance of Section 230 and
Congress’ clear intent in enacting it to protect websites from actions that
treat them as publishers or distributors of third-party content.
Section 230 immunity plays a vital role in the legal landscape that
has allowed the Internet to flourish. As this Court noted a decade ago in its
sole decision evaluating Section 230, “[t]he provisions of section 230(c)(1),
conferring broad immunity on Internet intermediaries, are [] a strong
demonstration of legislative commitment to the value of maintaining a free
market for online expression.” Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33,
56 (“Barrett”). In Barrett, this Court made clear that Section 230
immunizes website operators from actions by disgruntled businesses hoping
to punish them for allowing third-party content—even defamatory
content—to remain on their websites. Id. at 39-40. The court of appeal
followed Barrett in name alone. Op. at 27. It narrowly interpreted Section
230 to give plaintiffs a means of directly punishing website publishers for
displaying third party content. In doing so, it created a clear conflict
between its holding and the broad interpretation of Section 230 that this
Court recognized in Barrett.

4

The Section 230 ruling is particularly problematic because it is
utterly inconsistent with the court’s due process ruling. Section 230(c)(1)
broadly mandates that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” Yet here, the court
affirmed an injunction imposed on Yelp by stretching due process law to
conclude that Yelp was acting “with or for” Bird (Op. 30-31)—treating
Yelp as standing in Bird’s shoes solely based on Yelp’s role as an online
publisher of her alleged content. This contradiction injects confusion into
each of these legal principles.
This Court’s review in this matter is “necessary to secure uniformity
of decision [and] to settle an important question of law”—should California
courts continue to adhere to the broad interpretation of Section 230 that this
Court approved in Barrett? Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(b)(1).
The impact of the court of appeal’s due process and Section 230
decisions for the vitality of online speech is immense. Viewed only
through the prism of review websites such as Yelp, this is a tremendously
important issue because of the high value that easy access to consumer
reviews offers to the general public. E.g., Edwards v. District of Columbia,
755 F.3d 996, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[f]urther incentivizing a quality
consumer experience are the numerous consumer review websites, like
Yelp ..., which provide consumers a forum to rate the quality of their
5

experiences”). If Yelp and entities like it are denied their right to exercise
editorial control in publishing consumer reviews—providing businesses an
effective tool to remove critical commentary—consumers will suffer.
But the appellate decision reaches far beyond this single area, vast
though it may be. A wide array of website publishers display third-party
content, including political organizations, media entities, and repositories of
creative content such as YouTube, to name only a few. Some of this
content entertains or educates, while some simultaneously offends, and
much of it walks a line between protected and unprotected speech. The
value of such content lies in diversity, and websites benefit from offering
these disparate views and opinions to their users.
This does not leave plaintiffs like Hassell without a remedy—
although if it did it would not matter because Congress’ intent controls. For
twenty years, Congress has insisted that plaintiffs look to the content
creator alone for a remedy, through tools such as judgment liens and
contempt proceedings—post-judgment options that Hassell never pursued
here. During those twenty years, no court has approved Hassell’s stratagem
of denying a website publisher its due process rights in order to tactically
avoid the immunity Congress established through Section 230. The
appellate court’s blessing of the injunction entered against Yelp, following
an uncontested hearing to prove up the default judgment against Bird

6

(A00213), is a loophole that future plaintiffs will exploit to escape Section
230’s broad immunity.
Yelp and other websites will suffer as a result of this Opinion. But
more importantly, members of the public that rely on the wealth of online
third-party commentary—to aid decision-making on myriad issues like
consumer purchases, politics, and employment— will be harmed as
subjects of criticism follow Hassell’s example: intentionally sue the
commenter alone, perhaps in a manner that maximizes the chance that he or
she will be unable or unwilling to defend the lawsuit regardless of its
underlying merit, and then after a default judgment present the injunction to
the website publisher as an unassailable fait accompli.
The issues presented in this case are unresolved in California.
Together, the court of appeal’s holdings threaten to undermine the validity
and efficacy of the information available to consumers, and online speech
generally. On each of these questions of first impression in California, the
court of appeal reached the wrong result. Yelp requests, therefore, that this
Court accept review and resolve the important issues presented.
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Yelp’s Website Publishes Tens of Millions Of Third-Party
Consumer Reviews.

Yelp allows any member of the public to read and write online
reviews about local businesses, government services, and other entities.

7

A00240. Yelp is available to the public at no charge and without any
registration requirement. Id. Those who register by creating an account
may write reviews about businesses and service providers, and thus
contribute to a growing body of tens of millions of publicly-available
consumer reviews. Id. Tens of millions of other users read the reviews on
Yelp when making a wide range of consumer and other decisions. Id. The
businesses listed on Yelp also can create free accounts, which allow them
to publicly respond to any review, with such a response appearing next to
the original review. Id. Reviewers on Yelp can remove their reviews at
any time. A00841. As Yelp’s website explains, it applies automated
software to all reviews posted in an attempt to provide the most helpful
reviews to consumers. A00519.
B.

Hassell Obtains An Injunction Against Yelp Without
Giving It Any Notice.
1.

Third-Party Users Write Critical Reviews About
Hassell Law Group On Yelp.

Hassell, a San Francisco attorney, owns The Hassell Law Group,
P.C. A00006. According to Hassell’s Complaint, Bird suffered a personal
injury on June 16, 2012, and retained The Hassell Law Group. A00002-3.
After a few months, Hassell ended the attorney-client relationship. Id. On
January 28, 2013 a user with the screen name “Birdzeye B.” posted a onestar review of The Hassell Law Group on Yelp, complaining about
Hassell’s legal services. A00018. Believing that “Birdzeye B.” was Bird,
8

Hassell sent Bird an email that day, requesting she remove the “factual
inaccuracies and defamatory remarks” from Yelp. A00005. Bird replied
the next day, complaining about Hassell’s representation. A00348.
2.

Hassell Sues Bird And Obtains A Default
Judgment, Which Includes An Injunction Against
Yelp.

On April 10, 2013, Dawn Hassell individually, and the Hassell Law
Group P.C., filed a complaint against Bird, but not Yelp, in San Francisco
Superior Court. A00002. The suit asserted claims based on two allegedly
defamatory reviews—one by Birdzeye B. and another by a reviewer
identified as J.D. (A00004-5) 1—and sought compensatory and punitive
damages. It also sought injunctive relief against Bird only. A00013.
Although the Birdzeye B. public account profile stated that its creator lived
in Los Angeles (A00091), Bird was served through substitute service on the
owner of the Oakland home in which Bird was injured, who told the
process server that he had not seen Bird in months. A00026. On July 11,
2013, the court entered a default against Bird. A00023.
On November 1, 2013, Hassell filed a Summary of the Case in
Support of Default Judgment and Request for Injunctive Relief. A0003336. Hassell significantly expanded the relief being sought as described in
the Complaint, adding another allegedly defamatory statement to her claim
1

Hassell claimed that “J.D.” was Bird based on the review’s use of
capitalization, despite the content being at odds with the original challenged
statement. A00034, A00099.
9

(A00036, A00102) 2 and demanding for the first time that the court “make
an order compelling Defendant and Yelp to remove the defamatory
statements, including all entire posts, immediately. If for any reason
Defendant does not remove them all by the Court-ordered deadline (which
is likely given Defendant’s refusal to answer the complaint), the Court
should order Yelp.com to remove all 3 of them.” A00051 (emphasis in
original).
Plaintiffs’ Request for Judgment went even further, seeking “an
Order ordering Yelp.com to remove the reviews and subsequent comments
of the reviewer within 7 business days of the date of the court’s Order.”
A00051. Hassell intentionally did not serve her application for default
judgment on Yelp or otherwise notify Yelp about it. A00243; see also
A00837. The court granted the requested injunction, including the part
directed to non-party Yelp. A00213. The court made no factual findings as
to Yelp. Id.
C.

The Trial Court Denies Yelp’s Motion To Vacate The
Injunction.

On January 28, 2014, Yelp’s registered agent for service of process
received by mail a letter enclosing a notice of entry of judgment or order
and threatening Yelp with contempt proceedings if it did not comply with
the order. A00537-547. On February 3, 2014, Yelp responded to Hassell
2

She added another post from Birdzeye B. that primarily criticized
the litigation. A00036, A00102.
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by letter, stating that as a non-party which did not receive notice or an
opportunity to be heard, Yelp was not bound by the terms of the Judgment.
A00548-550. Yelp further explained that Section 230 precludes
enforcement of the injunction, or liability as to Yelp. A00549. Hassell did
not respond until April 30, 2014. She claimed that her office was
“currently setting a motion to enforce the court’s order against Yelp,” but
did not respond substantively to Yelp’s position. A00551.
On May 23, 2014, Yelp moved to vacate the Judgment. A00225470. Hassell opposed Yelp’s Motion to Vacate. A00471-572. On
September 29, 2014, the trial court denied Yelp’s Motion. A00808. It
quoted from Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 906 (“Ross”),
and Berger v. Superior Court (1917) 175 Cal. 719, 721 (“Berger”), to hold
that injunctions may run to non-parties who are aiding and abetting an
enjoined person to violate an injunction, and concluded that Yelp fit within
this exception to general due process requirements. A00808-809. It did not
address Yelp’s claim to immunity under Section 230.
D.

The Court Of Appeal Affirms The Trial Court’s Decision.

In a published decision, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s
conclusion that Yelp was bound by the injunction. Op. 1-2. As relevant
here, the court characterized the order requiring Yelp to remove content
from its website as a “removal order”—not an injunction (Op. 1)—and
treated the “removal order” as if it were separate from the Judgment (e.g.,
11

Op. 10-11 (concluding that Yelp was not aggrieved by the default
judgment, but was aggrieved by the removal order)). 3
After evaluating Yelp’s standing to appeal (issues not raised here),
the appellate court rejected Yelp’s argument that due process barred
enforcement of the injunction against it. Op. 18-23. The court noted, first,
that “An Injunction Can Run Against a Nonparty.” Op. 18. Citing a
handful of cases, the court concluded that “settled principles undermine
Yelp’s theory that the trial court was without any authority to include a
provision in the Bird judgment which ordered Yelp to effectuate the
injunction against Bird by deleting her defamatory reviews.” Op. 19.
The appellate court did not discuss or apply any of the requirements
that California courts have enunciated to justify extending an injunction to
a non-party. Op. 19-21. Instead, it simply distinguished the cases Yelp
cited, concluding that none presented facts similar to those presented here.
Id. The court made clear that its decision did not turn on the facts of the
case, and that the question of whether Yelp was “aiding and abetting”
Bird’s violation of the injunction “has no bearing on the question whether
3

Some of the court’s holdings seemed to grow out of this novel
characterization of the injunction against Yelp, and its Opinion ultimately
turned on its conclusion that Yelp was not subject to an injunction at all.
E.g., Op. 29 (“[a]gain though, the party that was enjoined from publishing
content in this case was Bird, ….”). But the “removal order” is a classic
injunction and the court of appeal created uncertainty in the law by treating
it as anything else. E.g., PV Little Italy, LLC v. MetroWork Condominium
Ass’n (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 132, 143 n.5.
12

the trial court was without power to issue the removal order in the first
instance.” Op. 21.
The court next rejected Yelp’s argument that the First Amendment
protects its right to distribute Bird’s speech. Op. 21-23. The court
distinguished a U.S. Supreme Court case holding that book and magazine
distributors are entitled to due process in connection with a seizure order.
Op. 21-22, citing Marcus v. Search Warrants (1961) 367 U.S. 717
(“Marcus”). The court explained that “in this context, it appears to us that
the removal order does not treat Yelp as a publisher of Bird’s speech, but
rather as the administrator of the forum that Bird utilized to publish her
defamatory reviews.” Id. The court also suggested that the issue was
whether a prior hearing was required, and that this case differs from
Marcus because here “specific speech has already been found to be
defamatory in a judicial proceeding.” Op. 23.
The court also rejected Yelp’s argument that the injunction is an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Op. 23-26. Expanding this Court’s
decision in Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141
(“Balboa Island”), the court held that “the trial court had the power to make
the part of this order requiring Yelp to remove the [statements at issue]
because the injunction prohibiting Bird from repeating those statements
was issued following a determination at trial that those statements are
defamatory.” Op. 25.
13

Finally, the court held that Section 230 did not protect Yelp from
Hassell’s injunction. Op. 26-31. Its decision turned largely on the fact that
Hassell intentionally chose not to sue Yelp, or even give it advance notice
of her claims, which the court found “distinguish[ed] the present case from
Yelp’s authority, all cases in which causes of action or lawsuits against
internet service providers were dismissed pursuant to section 230.” Op. 28
(citations omitted); see also id. 29-30 (distinguishing cases barring actions
for injunctive relief because in each the claim was asserted “against an
Internet service provider defendant in a civil lawsuit”); id. 30-31 (“[i]f an
injunction is itself a form of liability, that liability was imposed on Bird, not
Yelp”). The court rejected each of Yelp’s arguments. Op. 29-31.
Yelp did not file a petition for rehearing.
IV.
REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE TWO QUESTIONS
VITAL TO WEBSITES THAT PUBLISH THIRD-PARTY CONTENT
A.

This Court Should Accept Review To Establish That
Website Publishers Are Entitled To Notice And An
Opportunity To Be Heard Before They Are Ordered To
Remove Content.

The injunction here names Yelp—although it is not a party to this
action—and specifically orders Yelp to remove content from its website.
Invoking what it described as “settled principles” to reject Yelp’s due
process arguments, the court insisted that a non-party may be subject to an
injunction if it is “acting in concert with the enjoined party and in support
of its claims.” Op. 19 (citations omitted).
14

But none of the cases the court cited touches on the issue presented
here: whether a non-party to litigation has a right to challenge an order that
expressly names it and affects its own rights—here, Yelp’s right to maintain
critical reviews on its website, often in conflict with the desires of
businesses that disavow the criticism and aim to remove such commentary
from public view. 4 And none allowed an injunction where the non-party
has such a remote connection to the party enjoined. The only connection
between Yelp and Bird is that Bird, like tens of millions of people, posts
reviews on Yelp. The court’s application of an exceedingly narrow
exception to fundamental due process requirements grossly expanded that
exception beyond its intent and purpose.
1.

Due Process Requires Notice And An Opportunity
To Be Heard Before Being Subject To An Order
Affecting Rights.

The requirements of notice and hearing are firmly rooted in the
United States and California Constitutions. As the court made clear in
Estate of Buchman (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 546, 559, “[t]he fundamental
conception of a court of justice is condemnation only after notice and
hearing.” Thus, “[t]he power vested in a judge is to hear and determine, not

4

If Yelp immediately removed every review a business owner
claimed was false or even defamatory, it soon would have no critical
reviews on its website. To maintain the integrity of its website—for the
benefit of its users—Yelp must challenge claims such as Plaintiffs’ claims
here.
15

to determine without hearing,” and the Constitution requires a fair hearing.
Id. at 560; see also People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 263-64.
This Court long ago reaffirmed as a “seemingly self-evident
proposition that a judgment in personam may not be entered against one not
a party to the action.” Fazzi v. Peters (1968) 68 Cal.2d 590, 591 (“Fazzi”).
As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, courts “may not grant an enforcement
order or injunction so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons
who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according
to law.” Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B. (1945) 324 U.S. 9, 13 (“Regal
Knitwear”).
Despite this settled constitutional principle, and without giving Yelp
any notice, the trial court enjoined speech that Yelp displays and uses to
provide an aggregate rating of the Hassell Law Group to consumers looking
to hire lawyers. The court of appeal affirmed, declaring without analysis or
supporting legal authority that the injunction “does not treat Yelp as a
publisher of Bird’s speech, but rather as the administrator of the forum that
Bird utilized to publish her defamatory reviews.” Op. 22. This faulty
reasoning ignores Yelp’s important role as an online publisher and its
strong interest in developing and maintaining a trusted resource that
provides helpful consumer reviews to the public, including critical reviews
that dissatisfied clients post. Yelp and other online forums like it are not
merely the “administrators” of their websites—they are publishers and
16

editors whose actions to disseminate speech are fully protected by the First
Amendment and due process rights. Yelp, for example, has developed
automated software designed to enhance users’ experiences by showcasing
more helpful content over potentially less helpful content (like fake or paidfor reviews). E.g., A00519. And Yelp maintains terms of service and
content guidelines that, when violated, lead to the removal of offending
content. A00561.
To support its overreach, the court purported to distinguish Marcus,
367 U.S. 717, but it overlooked the fundamental point of Marcus and the
many other cases that protect the right to distribute speech. Op. 22-23,
citing Marcus; Heller v. New York (1973) 413 U.S. 483, 488. The U.S.
Supreme Court recognized a First Amendment right to distribute speech,
separate from the right to make the speech in the first instance, which
cannot be infringed without notice and an opportunity to be heard. See
Marcus, 367 U.S. at 731-732 (wholesale distributor of books and
magazines had right to prompt hearing in connection with seized materials);
Heller, 413 U.S. at 489-490 (seizure without a prior hearing is permissible
only if adequate procedural safeguards are followed).
The court of appeal’s invocation of Heller—which decided whether
a party is entitled to an adversarial hearing before speech is seized—missed
the point. Op. 23. Yelp did not receive any hearing; it had no opportunity
to challenge the trial court’s conclusion—reached in an uncontested
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hearing following a default judgment—that the speech at issue was
defamatory. Because Yelp has a separate First Amendment right to
distribute speech, it was entitled to a hearing to oppose entry of the
overbroad injunction that restrained speech on its website. See Heller, 413
U.S. at 489 (“because only a judicial determination in an adversary
proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only
a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid
final restraint” (citations, internal quotes omitted; emphasis in original)).
The fiction adopted by the court of appeal—inventing a role it coined
“administrator of the forum,” which apparently has none of the
constitutional protections granted to publishers—to brush aside Yelp’s clear
interest in the integrity of its website led to an unprecedented travesty of
justice here. With the court’s approval this shocking new framework to
deprive online publishers of due process and First Amendment rights can
be repeatedly applied throughout California.
Hassell intentionally sought to abrogate Yelp’s due process rights
when she moved for a default judgment; as she put it she “anticipated that
Defendant Bird would refuse to remove the Yelp review.” A00482. 5 The
court of appeal approved this gambit, holding that Yelp was not entitled to
notice. As shown below, however, the line of cases it invoked does not
5

Indeed, at the hearing on the motion to vacate, Hassell admitted
that she did not name Yelp in her Complaint because Yelp is immune from
suit under Section 230. A00837; see Section IV.B.1, infra.
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support the broad abandonment of due process that occurred here. This
Court should accept review to correct this incredible overreach, and ensure
that the narrow exception to black letter due process requirements is
appropriately limited.
2.

The Court Of Appeal Grossly Diminished
Fundamental Due Process Protections By
Expanding A Narrow Rule Allowing Courts To
Enjoin Aiders, Abettors, And Agents Of Parties.

The court of appeal rejected Yelp’s due process argument, invoking
what it characterized as “settled principles” of law that in limited
circumstances allow an injunction to “run to classes of persons with or
through whom the enjoined party may act.” Op. 19. In doing so, the court
invoked a narrow exception to the general due process requirement of
notice and an opportunity to be heard, which allows an injunction to be
enforced against a non-party who is not named in the injunction based on
evidence showing that the enjoined party and the non-party acted together
to evade the injunction, or the enjoined party and non-party have a close
relationship such as union and member. Op. 19-21.
The appellate court distinguished Yelp’s cases and held that these
“settled principles” authorized an injunction that expressly applies to Yelp,
without any evidence that Yelp engaged in the type of conduct, or had the
type of relationship with the enjoined party, that California courts
consistently have required to apply an injunction to a non-party. Id.
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In reaching its strained conclusion, the appellate court stretched far
beyond the original purpose of this common law doctrine. In Regal
Knitwear, 324 U.S. at 14, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the very
narrow purpose of this exception—that successors and assigns may be
bound by an injunction if they are “instrumentalities through which
defendant seeks to evade an order or [] come within the description of
persons in active concert or participation with them in the violation of an
injunction.” The Supreme Court did not decide if the non-parties there
could be held liable for violating the injunction, although it cautioned that it
“depends on an appraisal of his relations and behavior and not upon mere
construction of terms of the order.” Id. at 15; see also In re Lennon (1897)
166 U.S. 548, 554-555 (injunction against railroad company could be
enforced against one of its employees).
As one California court has explained, under the “common practice”
of “mak[ing] the injunction run also to classes of persons through whom the
enjoined party may act,” “enjoined parties may not play jurisdictional shell
games; they may not nullify an injunctive decree by carrying out prohibited
acts with or through nonparties to the original proceeding.” People ex rel.
Gwinn v. Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759, 766-767 (reversing
injunction against property owners that also would bind all future owners of
the property) (citations omitted; emphasis added). This rule allows courts
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to enjoin third parties who are acting at the behest and for the benefit of the
third party, and not in pursuit of their own rights.
Yelp is aware of only one case presenting similar facts, and that
court rejected the argument Hassell makes here. Blockowicz v. Williams
(N.D. Ill. 2009) 675 F.Supp.2d 912, aff’d (7th Cir. 2010) 630 F.3d 563.
There, the court refused to enforce an injunction as to a non-party website
hosting defamatory content, explaining that the website operator’s “only
act, entering into a contract with the defendants, occurred long before the
injunction was issued. Since the injunction was issued, [the website
operator] has simply done nothing, and it has certainly not actively assisted
the defendants in violating the injunction.” Id. at 916.
In contrast, none of the cases the court of appeal invoked to support
its holding enforced an injunction against a non-party on facts like those
here. Op. 19. In most, the court refused to enforce an injunction against a
non-party, finding that the relationship with the party was not close enough
to justify the attempt, or remanding for further consideration of the
evidence against the non-party. Berger, 175 Cal. at 719-720 (injunction
against union and members could not be enforced against non-union
member ); Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Garibaldi (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 345, 353 (refusing to enforce injunction against abortion
protestors neither named individually or as class members); People v.
Conrad (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 896, 903-904 (injunction against anti21

abortion group could not be applied to separate group); In re Berry (1968)
68 Cal.2d 137, 155-156 (reversing injunction related to union activity
because it enjoined persons acting “in concert among themselves”).
The court of appeal cited only one decision affirming enforcement of
an injunction against a non-party. Op. 19, citing Ross, 19 Cal.3d at 905. 6
In Ross, this Court held that an injunction against a state agency could be
enforced against county agencies that served as agents in administering the
program at issue. But that holding turned on the relationship between the
state and county agencies. Id. at 907-908. The Court explained that
because the state agency “could comply with the provisions of the … order
… only through the actions of county welfare departments, it is clear that
such counties could not disobey the order with impunity.” Id. at 909. Here,
in contrast, Bird herself could comply with the injunction at any time by
removing the review from Yelp; no cooperation by Yelp is required to
effectuate the injunction against Bird. A00841. And needless to say, Yelp
is not Bird’s agent.
The court of appeal’s opinion skews this line of cases, drastically
expanding them beyond their original intent, in three fundamental ways.
First, in none of the cases cited—and indeed, no case known to Yelp—did
6

In addition, the court separately rejected Yelp’s reliance on People
ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1125, in which this Court
affirmed a gang injunction against non-parties because “the gang itself,
acting through its membership, [] was responsible for creating and
maintaining the public nuisance” at issue.
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the court approve an injunction that required a specifically-named nonparty to act, or not act, as ordered. Each evaluated application of an
injunction to a non-party not explicitly named. E.g., In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d
at 155-156 (strikers, who were not members of enjoined union); Planned
Parenthood, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 350-351 (abortion protestors). In
explicitly directing the injunction to Yelp, the court treated Yelp as if it had
been present in the case all along with full opportunity to stand up for its
rights as a publisher, ignoring the reality that Hassell intentionally
prevented Yelp from learning about the application for the injunction in the
first place. The appellate court’s decision does not even mention the fact
that the court was applying these cases to a completely different set of facts,
or contemplate the implications of its decision to apply this line of cases to
the different facts presented here. Its perfunctory analysis led to the wrong
result.
Second, the court made clear that it did not base its decision on any
conduct by Yelp, explaining that the question of whether Yelp aided and
abetted Bird’s alleged violation of the injunction was “potentially
improper” and “has no bearing on the question whether the trial court was
without power to issue the [injunction] in the first instance.” Op. 21. Thus,
the court affirmed the injunction against Yelp without any evidence that
Yelp engaged in the type of conduct that courts—including this Court—
consistently require to justify applying an injunction to a non-party
23

allegedly colluding with the enjoined party. Op. 19; e.g., Regal Knitwear,
324 U.S. at 16 (a decision to enjoin a specific party as a successor or assign
would require “a judicial hearing, in which their operation could be
determined on a concrete set of facts”); see also id. at 15 (“whether a
nonparty is bound ‘depends on an appraisal of his relations and behavior’”).
Here, there was no appraisal of Yelp’s behavior or conduct before Yelp was
explicitly named in the injunction. A00211.
No prior case has gone so far. 7 Moreover, the court reached its
decision without any analysis or appreciation of how its unfettered
expansion of this formerly narrow exception to due process will affect
websites like Yelp, which publish content authored by tens of millions of
third parties, but which have no other relationships with those third parties
that justify being treated as their agents.
Third, the court ignored Yelp’s real interests in its own website—
permitting California courts to view a non-party’s conduct solely through
the lens of a plaintiff’s unopposed characterizations of the defendant’s
alleged conduct, without regard to the separate interests of the non-party
(here Yelp, a publisher) in the conduct or speech being enjoined. The court
rejected the cases Yelp cited solely because they involved money

7

See, e.g., This Would Make Me Yelp!, 111 North Hill Street, A
Blog of California Civil Procedure, July 10, 2016, available at
http://caccp.blogspot.com/2016/07/this-would-make-me-yelp.html?m=1
(“this one really manages to go off the rails”).
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judgments. Op. 20-21, citing Fazzi, 68 Cal.2d 590; Tokio Marine & Fire
Ins. Corp. v. W. Pac. Roofing Corp. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 110. The
appellate court did not explain why Yelp should receive less protection
against a prior restraint—which this Court has described as “one of the
most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence [which] carr[ies] a
heavy burden against constitutional validity” (People v. Lucas (2014) 60
Cal.4th 153, 261, disapproved on other grounds, People v. Romero (2015)
62 Cal.4th 1; citation omitted)—than it would against a mere money
judgment.
The court invoked Balboa Island to support its decision but this too
was an unwarranted expansion of existing law. In Balboa Island, this Court
held that a court may enjoin the repetition of a statement found to be
defamatory at a contested trial. 40 Cal.4th at 1158. The court approved the
injunction in part, although it also found part to be invalid because it
applied to the defendant and “all other persons in active concert and
participation with her,” but no evidence in the record supported a finding
that anyone else made defamatory statements. Id. at 1160. Here, unlike in
Balboa Island, the court approved a prior restraint (i) against a non-party
that had no notice or opportunity to oppose the injunction (ii) following a
default judgment, not a contested trial, (iii) based on an Order that did not
evaluate any of the individual statements to determine if they are false,
defamatory, and unprivileged. A00211. Cf. Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 57
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(“[d]efamation law is complex, requiring consideration of multiple
factors”). Balboa Island does not support the prior restraint entered against
Yelp here.
As discussed below, the court’s refusal to acknowledge Yelp’s
interests in its own website led to the second issue raised for review—the
court’s rejection of the statutory immunity that Section 230 guarantees Yelp
and others that provide forums for third-party content.
B.

This Court Should Accept Review To Make Clear That
Section 230 Bars Injunctions Against Website Publishers
Related To Third-Party Content.

This Court also should review—and reverse—the appellate court’s
conclusion that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act does not
apply to an injunction entered against a non-party. Op. 28. According to a
noted commentator, this is the worst recent Section 230 decision, and
“opens up holes that everyone—users and non-users alike—can abuse.”
See Goldman II, supra (“I can’t stress enough how terrible this opinion is,
and how much danger it poses to Section 230.”). 8

8

As Prof. Goldman proclaimed the same day the appellate court
issued its decision, “[i]t’s been a tough year for Section 230.” Eric
Goldman, WTF Is Going On With Section 230? – Cross v. Facebook,
Technology & Marketing Law Blog, June 7, 2016, available at
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/06/wtf-is-going-on-with-section230-cross-v-facebook.htm. In response to the decision here, Prof. Goldman
declared that “[t]oday’s opinion is worse than *all* of the cases I discussed
yesterday—and you better believe I don’t make that statement lightly!”
Goldman II, supra; see also California Appellate Court Decision Forces
Yelp to Remove Defamatory Review, Defamation Removal Law, available
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California’s courts of appeal have been increasingly inconsistent in
their application of Section 230. In the past decade, most courts have
routinely followed this Court’s mandate in Barrett to broadly construe
Section 230 immunity. E.g., Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 561, 563 (rejecting claims against Internet social networking
site brought by teenagers who were sexually assaulted by adults they met
through site). Recently, though, the First District Court of Appeal has
narrowly construed the statute to avoid immunity even where the statute
applies under its plain language. Hardin v. PDX, Inc. (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 159, 170 (misconstruing plaintiff’s claims to hold that Section
230 did not immunize software provider that court incorrectly characterized
as “participat[ing] in creating or altering content”).
Yelp submits, respectfully, that this case presents the perfect
opportunity for this Court to reconfirm the scope of Section 230 that
Congress intended and appellate courts nationwide have repeatedly
recognized. As it did a decade ago, this Court should make clear that
California courts must abide by Section 230’s grant of immunity to website

at http://www.defamationremovallaw.com/2016/07/14/california-appellatecourt-decision-forces-yelp-remove-defamatory-review/ (“[t]he case is
significant and represents a departure from current legal precedent because
Yelp was never a party to the lawsuit, and typically most courts would have
found the judgment unenforceable. The ruling marks yet another blow in
recent cases that have begun to chip away at the protections provided to
websites like Yelp by Section 230 ….”).
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operators like Yelp, which protects them from all court orders designed to
restrict the information they publish on their websites.
1.

Congress Enacted Section 230 To Protect Website
Publishers From Claims Like Those Asserted Here.

The Internet has effected one of the greatest expansions of free
speech and communications in history. This is no accident. In 1996, to
promote the free flow of information on the Internet, Congress resolved to
protect websites and other online providers from liability for their users’
content. Section 230 embodies that command, prohibiting courts from
treating such a provider as the “publisher or speaker” of third-party content.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Grounded in core First Amendment principles,
Section 230 offers strong protection for innovation and expansion of free
speech on the Internet. Since its enactment, federal and state courts have
interpreted it to provide a “robust” immunity to companies that operate
websites, such as Yelp, “from liability for publishing false or defamatory
material so long as the information was provided by another party.”
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119, 1122-23.
In Barrett, this Court affirmed that the statute’s “blanket immunity”
extends to “those who intentionally redistribute defamatory statements on
the internet.” 40 Cal.4th at 62-63.
The Act provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
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information provided by another information content provider,” and
separately precludes imposition of any liability under state law inconsistent
with its protections. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) & (e)(3). Under Section 230, a
website operator like Yelp is immune from claims if (1) it is a “provider or
user of an interactive computer service” (which all websites are); (2) the
action seeks to punish it as a “publisher or speaker”; and (3) the action is
based on “information provided by another information content provider.”
Id. As shown below, Section 230 bars the injunction against Yelp, as well
as any liability for failing to comply. The appellate court’s decision to the
contrary creates a gaping hole in Section 230 immunity that inevitably will
be exploited to pursue the very actions Congress intended to bar. 9
2.

The Court Of Appeal’s Superficial Analysis And
Failure To Follow Section 230’s Plain Terms Create
Tremendous Uncertainty in California As To The
Scope Of Immunity Under The CDA.

The court of appeal held that the injunction “does not violate section
230 because it does not impose any liability on Yelp,” elaborating that
“Hassell filed their complaint against Bird, not Yelp; obtained a default
9

This is no empty prognostication. Innovative attorneys are seeking
ways to obtain court orders for use in reputation management. E.g., The
Latest In Reputation Management: Bogus Defamation Suits From Bogus
Companies Against Bogus Defendants, Mar. 22, 2016, available at
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160322/10260033981/latestreputation-management-bogus-defamation-suits-bogus-companies-againstbogus-defendants.shtml; One Injunction To Censor Them All: Doe
Injunctions Threaten Speech Online, June 1, 2016, available at
http://www.knightfoundation.org/blogs/knightblog/2016/6/1/oneinjunction-censor-them-all-doe-injunctions-threaten-speech-online/.
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judgment against Bird, not Yelp; and was awarded damages and injunctive
relief against Bird, not Yelp.” Op. 28.
The court invoked the unique procedural posture of this case—the
result of Hassell’s intentional decision to deny Yelp the opportunity to
defend itself—explaining that “[n]either party cite[d] any authority that
applies section 230 to restrict a court from directing an Internet service
provider to comply with a judgment which enjoins the originator of
defamatory statements posted on the service provider’s Web site.” Id. This
circular reasoning only rewards Hassell’s disdain for due process.
The court’s decision is flatly contrary to other California decisions
(as well as the many decisions of other courts that have considered and
consistently applied Section 230). For example, in Kathleen R. v. City of
Liverpool (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 684, the court held that Section 230
precludes claims for injunctive relief, explaining that “by its plain language,
§ 230[(c)(1)] creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would
make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party
user of the service.” Id. at 692, 697-698 (citation, internal quotes omitted).
Thus, plaintiff’s equitable claims “contravene[d] section 230’s stated
purpose of promoting unfettered development of the Internet no less than
her damage claims.” Id. 10; see also Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99

10

See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. (E.D. Va. 2003) 261
F.Supp.2d 532, 540, aff’d, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. 2004) (“given that
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Cal.App.4th 816, 831 (“If by imposing liability … we ultimately hold eBay
responsible for content originating from other parties, we would be treating
it as the publisher, viz., the original communicator, contrary to Congress’s
expressed intent …” (citations omitted)); Doe II v. MySpace, 175
Cal.App.4th at 563, 572-573 (rejecting claims against Internet social
networking site based on failure to adopt safety measures to protect against
sexual predators; “[a]t its core, appellants want MySpace to regulate what
appears on its Web site” and “[t]hat type of activity—to restrict or make
available certain material—is expressly covered by section 230”).
The court of appeal drastically departed from these rulings by
misreading subsection (e)(3) of Section 230 and treating it as a limitation
on the broad immunity established by subsection (c)(1). The court held that
Section 230 did not apply to the prior restraint it imposed on Yelp “because
[the court did] not impose any liability on Yelp, either as a speaker or a
publisher of third party speech.” Op. at 29. But Yelp is named in the
injunction only for its role as publisher of the third-party reviews at issue, a
straightforward contradiction of subsection (c)(1)’s prohibition on treating
Yelp as the speaker or publisher of third-party content on its website.
Subsection (e)(3) does not alter the broad immunity provided by subsection
(c)(1), as the court of appeal implicitly held. It merely affirms the ability of
the purpose of § 230 is to shield service providers from legal responsibility
for the statements of third parties, § 230 should not be read to permit claims
that request only injunctive relief”).
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state courts to entertain state law claims that are “consistent” with Section
230, while making clear that “inconsistent” state law claims and liability
are barred. 11 The court of appeal’s decision to treat subsection (e)(3) as
establishing the scope of immunity undermines the broad protection that
Congress intended for online publishers like Yelp.
At bottom, the court’s conclusion that “[i]f an injunction is itself a
form of liability, that liability was imposed on Bird, not Yelp” (Op. at
30)—relying on the fiction that the injunction against Yelp was not actually
an injunction against Yelp (see footnote 3, supra)—exposes another
fundamental flaw in its decision. The court of appeal reached its result only
by violating subsection (c)(1) and treating Yelp as if it was the author (or
“speaker”) of the reviews at issue. It held that Yelp could be enjoined,
without notice or an opportunity to be heard, under a limited legal principle
that allows courts to extend injunctions to non-parties who act on behalf of
parties in violating the injunction, because Yelp purportedly was acting
“with or for” Bird as the publisher of the statements at issue. Op. 30-31,
citing Conrad, 55 Cal.App.4th at 903; see Section A.2, supra. This is, at its
core, treating Yelp as if it, rather than simply Bird, published the allegedly
defamatory content. The court of appeal’s due process and Section 230
11

If section (e) encapsulated Section 230 immunity, then Section
230 would not bar federal civil claims. Plainly, that is not the case. E.g.,
Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015)
144 F.Supp.3d 1088 (Section 230 barred federal and state claims).
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holdings are fundamentally at odds with each other, resulting in a confusing
and contradictory interpretation of each of these legal principles.
“An action to force a website to remove content on the sole basis
that the content is defamatory is necessarily treating the website as a
publisher, and is therefore inconsistent with section 230.” Medytox
Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc., 152 So.3d 727, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App., 2014) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief). Thus,
“plaintiffs who contend they were defamed in an Internet posting may only
seek recovery from the original source of the statement” (Barrett, 40
Cal.4th at 40 (emphasis added)), because “Congress has decided that the
parties to be punished and deterred are not the internet service providers but
rather are those who created and posted the illegal material” (M.A. ex rel.
P.K. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC (E.D. Mo. 2011) 809 F.Supp.2d
1041, 1055). The court of appeal’s holding flies in the face of these and
other cases barring claims against website publishers.
Nor is it relevant that many cases applying Section 230 to
defamation claims involve “allegations of defamatory conduct by a third
party, and not a judicial determination that defamatory statements had, in
fact, been made by such third party on the Internet service provider’s
website.” Op. 30. This case was able to proceed to a default judgment only
because one of Hassell’s targets—the one that had the financial
wherewithal to defend against her demand for an injunction—was
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purposefully not named as a party or served with process in the case, and
therefore could not prevent a result that is plainly barred by Section 230. In
any event, the court’s reasoning ignores the language of the CDA, which
assumes that the statements are actually defamatory, but provides immunity
regardless. See also Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 39-40. This is a distinction
without a difference, which only serves to inject confusion and ambiguity
into Section 230 jurisprudence.
As Hassell admits, there is “vibrant, extensive national jurisprudence
on section 230.” Respondents’ Appeal Brief (“R.A.B.”) at 43. Yet, Hassell
did not cite a single case to support her proposition that the CDA allows
interactive computer services to be subject to injunctions to remove thirdparty content so long as they are not named in an action. Not a single court
in any jurisdiction, state or federal, has so held—which is not surprising,
given that Section 230(c)(1) flatly prohibits such a result, and plaintiffs
typically satisfy the basic due process requirements that should have
protected Yelp here.
This Court’s admonition a decade ago in Barrett applies just as
forcefully here. “The Court of Appeal gave insufficient consideration to
the burden its rule would impose on Internet speech. … Congress sought to
‘promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services’” by granting broad immunity to “Internet
intermediaries” such as Yelp. 40 Cal.4th at 56 (citations omitted; emphasis
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added). California should not break new ground to embrace such a skewed
interpretation of Section 230—and invite the many lawsuits that will be
filed here by forum shopping plaintiffs eager to force websites to remove
critical content (contrary to this Court’s warning in Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at
58). This case requires a careful analysis of Section 230’s language and
purpose. That analysis simply did not occur here, leading to the patently
incorrect interpretation of Section 230 that the court of appeal adopted.
V.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Yelp respectfully requests that the
Court grant its Petition for Review and, on review, reverse the orders of the
trial court and appellate court, and direct those courts to enter an order
granting Yelp’s Motion to Vacate the Judgment.
Dated: July 18, 2016

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
Thomas R. Burke
Rochelle L. Wilcox
By: /s/ Rochelle L. Wilcox
Rochelle L. Wilcox
Attorneys for Non-Party Appellant
YELP INC.

35

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
(Cal. Rules of Court 8.504(d))
The text of this brief consists of 8,396 words as counted by the
Microsoft Word word-processing program used to generate this brief,
including footnotes but excluding the tables, the cover information required
under rule 8.204(b)(10), the court of appeal opinion, this certificate, and the
signature block.
Dated: July 18, 2016

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
Thomas R. Burke
Rochelle L. Wilcox

By: /s/ Deborah A. Adler
Deborah A. Adler
Attorneys for Non-Party Appellant
YELP INC.

36

SERVICE LIST
Monique Olivier, Esq.
Duckworth Peters Lebowitz Olivier LLP
100 Bush Street, Suite 1800
San Francisco, CA 94104
Email: Monique@dplolaw.com

Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Respondents
Dawn Hassell, et al.

Nitoj Singh, Esq.
Dhillon Law Group Inc.
177 Post Street, Suite 700
San Francisco, CA 94108
Email: nsingh@dhillonsmith.com
Hon. Ernest Goldsmith
Dept. 302
San Francisco Superior Court
Civic Center Courthouse
400 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102-4514

Case No.: CGC-13-530525

Court of Appeal
First Appellate District, Div. Four
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102

Case No. A143233

